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ance, it appears that the judiciary has not been provided with a
satisfactory statutory tool for harmonizing NLRB procedures and
the FOIA. The present legislative scheme fails to reconcile the needs
of the NLRB in its prosecutorial capacity with the general policy of
governmental disclosure underlying the FOIA. Ultimately, resolution of the exemption 7(A) imbroglio lies with the legislature. It is
hoped that Title Guaranteeand its progeny will impress upon Congress the need for clarification of the scope of exemption 7.
Robert J. Hausen

A RETREAT FROM ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS

Economou v. United States Department of Agriculture
For many years, the courts have sought to achieve a delicate
equilibrium between the protection of individual rights and the insulation of government officials from liability for the infringement
of those rights.' The judicial attitude favoring absolute immunity
for federal officials 2 culminated in Barr v. Mateo,3 a defamation
The debate concerning the appropriate balance between individual protection and
governmental immunity has been raging since the early days of the common law. See, e.g.,
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-2
(1963). The problem is perplexing because of the strong countervailing policies that underlie
each argument. Opponents of governmental immunity have argued that since it is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that no man stands above the law, public
office should not shield its occupant from liability for his acts. Proponents of governmental
immunity, however, point to the ancient maxim that the sovereign cannot be sued in his own
court. See, e.g., Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263,
263 (1937). As the individual sovereign was replaced by modem bureaucratic government, the
concept of sovereign immunity was extended to the state and to public officials acting as
agents of the state. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970-71 (4th ed. 1971). This
idea had as its fundamental support
two mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of
bad faith, of subjecting to liability [a governmental] officer who is required, by
the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the
threat of liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and judgment required by the public good.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974) (footnote omitted), citing Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209, 223 (1963).
2 The federal penchant for granting absolute immunity originally was evidenced by the
constitutional grant of immunity to legislators. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. Absolute immunity
subsequently was extended to judges by the federal courts. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1871). Similarly, the federal courts have afforded the chief officials of the
executive branch absolute immunity. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
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action in which the Supreme Court for the first time granted absolute immunity to a lower echelon executive official.' Recently, however, in Economou v. United States Departmentof Agriculture,5 the
Second Circuit held that officials of the Department of Agriculture
who were sued for defamation and malicious prosecution were
shielded only by a qualified immunity.' In so deciding, the
Economou court indicated that Barr has been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.7
The Economou controversy began in February 1970, when the
Secretary of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint against
Arthur N. Economou and his futures trading company, alleging that
Economou had failed to meet certain requirements specified by the
Commodity Exchange Act for registered futures commission merchants.8 The case was heard by a Department of Agriculture hearing
examiner, and, in August 1971, a report adverse to Economou was
issued? While the report was under review by the Judicial Officer
of the Department of Agriculture, Economou brought suit against
(1950) (Attorney General, Director of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, and the Director of
Immigration); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927)
(special assistant to the Attorney General). While sharing the federal idea of absolute immunity for judges, see, e.g., Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810), and legislators, see,
e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 10, the states traditionally have withheld immunity for government officials where malice or bad faith has been alleged. See, e.g., Paoli v. Mason, 325 Ill.
App. 197, 59 N.E.2d 499 (1945); State ex rel. Robertson v. Farmers' State Bank, 162 Tenn.
499, 39 S.W.2d 281 (1931).
3 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Barr involved a defamation action against the Acting Director of the Office of Rent
Stabilization. In ruling that the defendant was absolutely immune, the Court recognized that
the lower federal courts previously had granted absolute immunity to subordinate federal
officials. Id. at 572 & n.9, citing, inter alia, Taylor v. Glotfelty, 201 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1952)
(per curiam); Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 665 (1941).
The Barr Court specified two requirements for the applicability of absolute privilege: the
action must have been discretionary, and it must have been "within the outer perimeter of
[the official's] line of duty." Id. at 575.
5 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No.
76-709), aff'g in part and rev'g in part No. 42465 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1975).
535 F.2d at 696.
Id. at 691.
Pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp. V 1975), the Secretary
of Agriculture has the authority to suspend the registration of any broker who wilfully violates
any of the rules, regulations, or orders of the Department of Agriculture or any commission
thereunder. See generally Campbell, TradingFutures Under the Commodity Exchange Act,
26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 215-54 (1958). Following an audit, the Commodity Exchange Authority found that Economou's company had failed to maintain the minimum capital balance
prescribed by 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1976). As a result, the Secretary of Agriculture's complaint
ordered Economou to show cause why his license should not be suspended. 535 F.2d at 689.
' Arthur N. Economou, Commodity Exch. Auth. No. 167 (Chief Hearing Examiner Aug.
17, 1971).
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the Department, the Commodity Exchange Authority, and several
officials of both these governmental bodies to enjoin the administrative proceedings and to recover damages. Economou's complaint
was based essentially upon malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
and defamation. 10 While holding the damage portion of the action
in abeyance, the district court twice denied Economou's application
for injunctive relief.II Thereafter, in the Department of Agriculture's
administrative proceeding, the hearing examiner's findings were affirmed by the Judicial Officer and Economou's license to trade in
the commodities market was suspended by the Secretary of Agriculture.' 2 Economou then petitioned the Second Circuit for review of
the enforcement order suspending his license.' 3 In a March 1974
decision, the Second Circuit set aside the Secretary's order.' 4 Subsequently, Economou, after having allowed his damage action to lay
idle for several years, resumed its prosecution in the district court.
Reasoning that suit against the Department of Agriculture and the
Commodity Exchange Authority had not been authorized by Congress, and that the individual officials warranted absolute immunity under Barr, the court dismissed the action.' 5 On appeal to the
Second Circuit, Judge Mansfield, writing for a unanimous panel,'"
affirmed the dismissal as to the Department of Agriculture and the
Commodity Exchange Authority, agreeing that Congress had not
authorized suit against either entity.'7 As to the individual defen,' 535 F.2d at 689-90.
" Id.
2 Arthur N. Economou, Commodity Exch. Auth. No. 167 (Chief Judicial Officer Jan.
15, 1973).
" The Commodity Exchange Act specifies that the person against whom an enforcement
order is issued may obtain a review of such order by direct appeal to the "United States court
of appeals of the circuit in which that individual is doing business." 7 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp. V
1975).
" The court found that a warning letter, ordinarily sent prior to the institution of the
proceedings, had not been issued by the Department. Hence the necessary element of wilfulness was not established. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519 (2d
Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
"SNo. 42465, slip op. at 2-6.

" The panel consisted of Judges Mansfield, Timbers, and Meskill.
" 535 F.2d at 690. In holding that the Department of Agriculture and the Commodity
Exchange Authority could not be sued, the Second Circuit emphasized that it considered this
to be a settled principle. Since Judge Mansfield found that Congress had not authorized suits
against the Department of Agriculture, he reasoned that neither could the Commodity Exchange be sued. Id. at 690. This conclusion was based upon the premise that "[wihen
Congress authorizes one of its agencies to be sued eo nomine, it does so in explicit language,
or impliedly because the agency is the offspring of such a suable entity." Blackmar v. Guerre,

342 U.S. 512, 515 (1952).

In light of recent changes in the Federal Tort Claims Act, Economou had argued that
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dants, however, the court reversed and remanded, holding that they
were entitled, at most, to qualified immunity.
In assessing the possible liability of the individual defendants,
the Second Circuit maintained that Barr was no longer "the last
word in this evolving area.' 5 This belief was premised upon several
recent Supreme Court decisions 9 which the Second Circuit perceived as evidencing an erosion of the absolute immunity granted
in Barr. Although these cases involved actions brought against state
executive officials under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,2" the
Economou court believed that they served to elucidate the theory
of official immunity utilized by the Supreme Court in Barr. The
Second Circuit interpreted these cases as indicating the Court's
preference for qualified rather than absolute immunity for executive
officials. 2' Analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in these cases,
the complaint could be amended to include the United States as a defendant. This
amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970)),
provides that the United States may be liable for certain intentional torts committed by
federal investigative or law enforcement officers. The Economou court stated, however, that
this amendment was inapplicable because it became effective after the acts complained of
occurred. The cause of action was therefore governed by prior law which immunized the
United States from liability for the intentional torts of its agents. 535 F.2d at 690 n.2. In
addition, the court noted that even were the new amendment applicable, it would not apply
to the Economou defendants since they did not appear to fit the description used by the
amendment for "investigative or law enforcement officers." Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(Supp. V 1975) ("investigative or law enforcement officers" defined as those officers empowered "to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal
law"). It should also be noted that notwithstanding this amendment, the United States
remains immune from liability based on defamation. See id.
IS 535 F.2d at 696.
" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1973); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see note 21 infra.
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
" 535 F.2d at 695. In the earliest of the Supreme Court cases relied upon by the Second
Circuit, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), several black clergymen sought to recover
damages caused by an unconstitutional arrest and trial from the municipal judge before
whom the case was tried and the arresting officers. Suit was brought in federal court under §
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (original version at ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13 (1871)), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
For a discussion of the development of § 1983, see McCormack, Federalismand Section 1983:
Limitations on JudicialEnforcement of ConstitutionalProtections,60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974);
Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (1953).
Although § 1983 provides that "every person" is liable for its violation, the Pierson court
concluded that § 1983 did not abolish the settled common law principle of absolute immunity
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Judge Mansfield determined that the Court now requires an evaluation of the extent of immunity granted to the particular type of
official at common law and the policy reasons for its support.2 A
determination must then be made whether the common law immunity is still necessary to protect such an official in the performance of his duties. As a result of this view of the Supreme Court's
position, the Second Circuit concluded that absolute immunity
should be extended to executive officials only where it can be shown
that a qualified immunity does not provide the protection necessary
to ensure the proper performance of their official duties.2
In determining the degree of immunity to be afforded the
Economou defendants, the Second Circuit first ascertained the type
for judges. 386 U.S. at 553-55. As to the policemen, however, the Court found that rather
than possessing absolute immunity at common law, policemen were protected from suit for
false arrest only when the arrest was made in good faith and for probable cause. Voicing the
opinion that § 1983 "should be read against the background of [common law] tort liability,"
id. at 556, quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), the Supreme Court held the
defense of good faith and probable cause applicable to a policy officer sued in a § 1983 action.
386 U.S. 556-57.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1973), the Court continued its examination of
the availability of official immunity in § 1983 actiofis. There, the Supreme Court reversed
the dismissal of a § 1983 action brought against Ohio state officials for their actions during
the Kent State incident. Rejecting the defendants' claims for absolute immunity, the Court
stated:
"If this extreme position could be deemed to be well taken, it is manifest that the
fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be
the supreme law of the land. . . . When there is a substantial showing that the
exertion of state power has overridden private rights secured by the Constitution,
"
the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry. ..
Id. at 248-49, quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932). Since § 1983
"include[s] within its scope the 'misuse of state power, possessed by virtue of state law,"'
416 U.S. at 243, quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), the ScheuerCourt reasoned
that executive officials "could not be totally exempt, by virtue of some absolute immunity,
from liability under its terms." 416 U.S. at 243. Accordingly, the Court afforded these officials
only a qualified immunity, the existence of which depended upon the good faith and reasonableness of their actions. Id. at 247-48.
In a third Supreme Court decision, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), several high
school students sought damages under § 1983, alleging that their expulsion from school
without a hearing violated their right to due process. Noting that "state courts have generally
recognized that [public school officials] should be protected from tort liability under state
law for good faith nonmalicious action to fulfill their official duties," id. at 318, and employing
the reasoning of Pierson and Scheuer, the Court posited that school officials were entitled to
a qualified immunity. Id. at 318-21. See generally Note, Students' Rights Versus Administrators' Immunity: Goss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strickland, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 102 (1975).
A similar analysis was used by the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976). There, the Court granted absolute immunity to a public prosecutor sued under § 1983,
maintaining that it was necessary for the adequate performance of his duties. See notes 4653 and accompanying text infra.
2 535 F.2d at 691-95.
"3Id. at 695.
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of immunity granted to administrative officials at common law.24
The court noted that at common law the character of the governmental function dictated the nature of the immunity to be afforded
a government official.2 5 The Second Circuit also recognized that it
has traditionally believed that participants in the judicial and legislative processes require the full protection provided by absolute
immunity." This belief was predicated upon two assumptions:
First, the beneficial effect which civil suits may have in deterring
official misconduct is heavily outweighed by the deleterious effect
such suits may have upon the performance of an official's functions; 2 and second, the wide discretionary powers which these offi'
cials wield leave them "particularly vulnerable to damage suits."
Analyzing the functions of an administrative official, the court
stated that although at common law administrative officials were
given a "considerable measure of immunity," its extent was not as
well defined as that enjoyed by judges, legislators, and prosecutors.2 9
Nevertheless, the Economou court recognized that an argument
could be made that several of the administrative officials in
Economou performed functions analogous to those performed by
public prosecutors, whose common law absolute immunity had been
30
reasserted recently by the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman.
The Second Circuit refuted this analogy, however, maintaining that
officials who prosecute administrative complaints do not face the
constrictions in time or rely as heavily on dubious oral testimony as
do prosecutors." Reasoning that "the discretionary powers of administrative officials are more circumscribed" than those of legislators, judges, and prosecutors, the court concluded that absolute
immunity was not necessary to ensure the proper performance of the
24

Id.

23 Id.

Id.
v Id.
26

'Id.

SId.
424 U.S. 409 (1976). In Imbler, the plaintiff brought suit under § 1983 against the state
prosecuting officer for the alleged suppression of favorable evidence at his murder trial. In
granting absolute immunity to the prosecutor, the Supreme Court continued its practice of
determining the applicability of immunity to § 1983 defendants on the basis of their status
at common law. Id. at 421. Recognizing that at common law it was well settled that a
prosecutor enjoyed the same type of immunity as that of a judge or juror acting within the
scope of his duties, the Court held absolute immunity applicable to the prosecutor. Id. at 424.
11535 F.2d at 696 n.8. In Imbler, the Supreme Court expressed the fear that prosecutors,
"acting under serious constraints of time and even information," would be extremely hampered in the performance of their duties absent absolute immunity. 424 U.S. at 425.
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executive official's duties. Consequently, the Second Circuit instructed the district court that in a subsequent trial the Department
of Agriculture officials should be protected only by the qualified
immunity formulated in the section 1983 cases.3 2 The court stipulated that under this standard, the officials would be immune if
they had acted in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.3
In construing the recent Supreme Court cases as heralding a
trend away from the Barr doctrine, the Second Circuit minimized
the fact that these cases were not common law tort actions, as were
both Barr and Economou, but rather were founded on violations of
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.3 4 Since section 1983 actions
stem from the deprivation of constitutional rights, 35 they differ significantly from the common law tort action before the Court in Barr.
The Supreme Court itself has indicated that the principles discussed in Barr are distinct from those involved in a constitutionally
derived action.3 6 It is submitted, therefore, that the Economou
court's application of the section 1983 qualified immunity to a common law tort action may have improperly disregarded the different
approaches to immunity utilized in common law and constitutional
actions. In this regard, it should be noted that the Second Circuit
did not mention that a majority of the circuits apparently still fol32 535 F.2d at 696.

31Id. The Second Circuit instructed the district court that if the plaintiff had evidence
to show that the administrative hearings were instituted "maliciously and without reasonable
grounds," or that the press release was issued "knowingly," then he should be afforded the
chance to have his grievance heard. Id. Absent such a showing, and upon a showing of good
faith and reasonableness on the part of the defendants, the court noted that the trial judge
could make use of the summary judgment device to dismiss the action. This procedure, the
Economou court declared, would serve to protect the defendant officials from the "excessive
burden" of a prolonged trial. Id.
See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly stated that the reasoning of Barr is
inapplicable to the § 1983 cases, it has given some indications to that effect. In Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court referred to Barr as "the somewhat parallel context of
the privilege of public officers from defamation actions," id. at 242, and as "a context other
than a § 1983 suit." Id. at 247. Furthermore, the Court cited Barr with apparent favor on
both occasions. Additionally, it is worthy to note that in the § 1983 cases, the Court determined the existence of an official's immunity by interpreting general state common law. The
determination of a federal official's immunity, however, is a unique development of federal
common law. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). This distinction is important because
there is a marked difference in the handling of executive immunity between the state and
federal courts. See note 2 supra. See also Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v.
Smithsonian Inst., No. 74-1899, slip op. at 4-5 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 1976) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S.
Sept. 22, 1976) (No. 76-418), vacated en banc, No. 74-1899 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1976).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:251

low the Barr decision and distinguish between the immunity
granted in common law tort actions and that afforded in constitutional actions.3 The general adherence by the circuits to the Barr
absolute immunity in tort actions is illustrated by a recent First
Circuit decision, Berberian v. Gibney.35 The Berberian court dismissed an action brought against an Internal Revenue Service official reasoning that Barr mandated absolute immunity.39 In so holding, the Berberiancourt made no mention of the section 1983 cases
relied upon so heavily by the Second Circuit in Economou.
Subsequent to Economou, however, the District of Columbia
Circuit, relying on the recent 1983 cases, also found Barr no longer
dispositive of the immunity issue. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic
4" a decision that
Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institution,
has
subsequently been vacated by the court sitting en banc, was a defamation action against an official of the Smithsonian Institution.
The court, rather than completely disavowing the Barr decision as
did the Second Circuit," attempted to reconcile it with the more
31 The other circuits have consistently applied the Barr absolute immunity doctrine to
federal officers sued in common law tort actions. See, e.g., Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F.2d 790
(1st Cir. 1975); Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830
(1975); Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); Cavez
v. Kelley, 364 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1966); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961).
Since § 1983 by its own terms is restricted to suits against state officers, Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 & n.2 (1963), the Supreme Court has developed an analogous
damage action against federal officials based directly on the Constitution. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A qualified immunity similar to that available
in the § 1983 cases has been applied in these cases. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972), on remand from 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Mark v.
Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 670-73 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th
Cir. 1974). Thus, in applying an absolute immunity when a federal official is sued for a
common law tort, and a qualified immunity when the action is based directly on the Constitution, or in the case of a state officer when the action is based indirectly on the Constitution
by means of § 1983, the federal courts have maintained the distinction between the Barr
absolute immunity and the constitutional qualified immunity doctrines.
514 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1975).
3' Id. at 793.
40 No. 74-1899 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 1976), petitionfor cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S.
Sept. 22, 1976) (No. 76-418), vacated en banc, No. 74-1899 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1976).
" Although the Expeditions and Economou courts appeared to agree that the pivotal
question in deciding whether absolute immunity should apply is whether such immunity is
necessary for the effective performance of the duties of the executive official, see No. 74-1899,
slip. op. at 26; notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra, the courts differed on the manner
of application of this test. While the Expeditions court felt that the analysis should be based
on the realities of each official's activities, the Economou court decided that the resolution
of this issue could be made generally for all executive officials.
Extending from the Secretary of Agriculture to Commodity Exchange Authority auditors, the list of defendants confronting the Second Circuit encompassed the entire gamut of
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recent section 1983 cases. 2 To accomplish this, the Expeditions
court advocated a case-by-case determination of whether a grant of
absolute immunity is proper for a particular government official.
The mode of analysis to be used by the trial court in resolving this
question consists of a determination under Barr of whether the action complained of was discretionary and within the scope of the
particular official's duties, 43 and an evaluation of whether the reasons for granting absolute immunity to the government official justify the subordination of the plaintiff's interests. In making this
latter determination, the Expeditions court emphasized that the
relation of disputed activity to the defendant official's overall functions should be an essential factor. 4 If absolute immunity is held to
be inapplicable, Expeditions would require a determination of the
propriety of a grant of immunity based on whether the defendant
45
officials acted in good faith and on reasonable grounds.
levels in the Department of Agriculture. By applying a qualified immunity to every one of
these defendants without analyzing the particular functions of each, the Second Circuit in
effect determined that absolute immunity is unnecessary for any official performing an administrative function. As a result, it would appear that the lower courts within the circuit
are foreclosed from making a finding that such immunity is necessary for a particular administrative official.
In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit was faced with only one individual defendant. The Expeditions court did not find it necessary to pass on the merits of his claim to
absolute immunity. Rather, the court asserted that the determination of whether the need
for absolute immunity existed should be made by the trial court on the basis of the functions
of the particular official involved. No. 74-1899, slip op. at 25-30. As a result, it can be seen
that the existence of absolute immunity in that circuit was not foreclosed by the Expeditions
decision.
It is interesting to note that in reaching this result, the Expeditions court did not use
the Economou decision for support. Rather, it erroneously made reference to Economou as a
"§ 1983 action against Dept. of Agriculture officials." Id. at 21 n.52. In so doing, the District
of Columbia Circuit not only misread Economou's complaint but overlooked the fact that §
1983, by its own terms, is inapplicable to federal officials. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
42 Discussing Barr and the § 1983 cases, the Expeditions court said:
As the Court stated in Barr,absolute privilege is "an expression of a policy designed
to aid in the effective functioning of government." Since then, it has consistently
applied a complex, factoring approach, to single out instances where the advancement of government operation by the recognition of absolute immunity outweighs
the subordination of litigant rights involved. The mixed outcomes which the Court
has reached, as well as the method and language it has used, make clear that it is
proceeding by a case-by-case, functional analysis.
Barr, itself, which upheld the absolute immunity of a sub-agency head in
issuing a press release announcing suspension of two employees, clearly exhibits the
approach which the Court has subsequently followed.
No. 74-1899, slip op. at 17 (footnote omitted).
'3 Id. at 14-15.
41Id. at 25-27.
13Id. at 30. In a strong dissent, Judge Leventhal severely criticized the limitation on Barr
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The rationales used in Economou and Expeditions are in conflict with that of Barrand the decisions of a majority of the circuits.
Even were Barr inapplicable, however, the Second Circuit's rationale appears to be deficient in other critical areas. The insufficiency
in the Economou court's opinion is indicated by its comments on
Imbler. In discussing this case as a means to contrast the immunity
needs of a prosecutor and those of an executive official, the Second
Circuit failed to adequately refute the similarity in the positions of
the two classes of officials. The Supreme Court's major concern in
Imbler was that "harassment by unfounded litigation" could possibly result in deviation from duty on the part of the prosecutor and
thereby inhibit the unshackled "independence of judgment required
by his public trust."" This reasoning would also seem to apply to a
Department of Agriculture official performing a prosecutorial function.47 Assuredly, it is logical to assume that the apprehension of
potential liability could easily dissuade even the most ardent Agriculture official from strictly enforcing the rules of the commodities
exchange.
The Imbler Court also cited the opportunity for appellate review of a prosecutor's errors as an important factor in the grant of
absolute immunity. By rectifying any injustice caused by prosecutorial abuses, appellate review assures the victim that he will suffer
no lasting injury. 8 Therefore, the Court reasoned that there exists
little need for a civil damage action to protect such an individual. 9
Since the subject of a Department of Agriculture examination may
seek not only intra-agency review of the hearing results,"0 but also
proposed by both the Expeditions and the Economou courts, arguing that Barrshould apply
without qualification until the Supreme Court decides to overrule it. Id. at 7-11 (Leventhal,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Leventhal stated that the authority to
overrule a Supreme Court decision lay exclusively in the Court itself. Id. at 10. In analyzing
the Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Barr, Judge Leventhal argued that due to their
reliance on state common law, they did not overrule Barr. Judge Leventhal also contended
that Barr, rather than being an undesirable vestige of a once popular philosophy, still finds
support in public policy, particularly in guarding against the possibility of retaliation by the

subject of an administrative action. Id. at 2-3.
"

424 U.S. at 423.

The Secretary of Agriculture is mandated by the Commodity Exchange Act to police
and regulate the commodities markets. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp. V 1975). See also Note,
Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 215, 223-24
(1958). Under orders from the Secretary of Agriculture, various officials serve complaints and
prosecute violations at administrative hearings, performing a function analogous to that of
public prosecutors.
11424 U.S. at 427.
IId.

See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1970) (amended 1974); Note, The Functions of the Judicial Officer,
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direct review by a court of appeals, 51 it is submitted that the protection afforded him by appellate review is as great as that afforded
the subject of prosecutorial abuse. Thus, it would seem that the
principal reasons propounded in Imbler for granting prosecutors
absolute immunity apply equally as well to certain of the officials
in Economou.12 Consequently, the distinctions drawn between the
two classes of officials by the Second Circuit, namely the time constraints and dubious oral testimony faced by the prosecutor, appear
5
artificial and unconvincing.
The inability on the part of the Second Circuit in Economou
to secure its decision on a sound analytical base is also demonstrated by its failure to address the argument that administrative
officials, in promulgating rules and adjudicating administrative
controversies, perform functions analogous to those performed by
legislators and judges. 4 It is axiomatic that administrators are often
empowered to perform quasi-legislative duties in formulating rules
and regulations within the ambit of the administrative body's responsibility.5 5 In addition, they are often authorized to execute
United States Department of Agriculture, 26 GEo.

WASH.

L. REv. 277, 278 (1958).

51 See note 13 supra.

12 See Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HAv. L. Rav. 44, 56-59, 75-76 & n.9 (1960). Moreover, one

commentator has argued that since administrative officials "evolve public policy" in their
decision-making capacities, they have a more justifiable claim to absolute immunity than do
prosecutors. Note, Immunity of Prosecuting Officials from Suit for Alleged Deprivationof
Civil Rights, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 244, 249 (1967). This commentator contends that the public
prosecutor "operates within a much narrower framework from the standpoint of creating
public policy," thereby making the propriety of his decisions more easily and certainly
weighed. Id. at 250.
51The court's assumption that administrative officials do not face severe time constraints overlooks the fact that the number of cases handled by an administrative official may
far exceed the number handled by a prosecutor. This is due to the fact that "the administrative agencies have outstripped the courts in the volume and importance of the matters within
their jurisdiction." 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.02, at 7 (1958), quoting
ProposedStanding Comm. on AdministrativeProcedureand Practice:Hearings on H.R. 462
Before the Special Subcomm. of the Comm. on Rules, 84th Cong., 2d Seass. 26 (1956) (statement of Judge Peck). Additionally, the Second Circuit's reliance on the fact that the Agriculture officials in Economou based their investigation on written records fails to take into
account the fact that documentary proof, especially complex financial data, may often be the
subject of doubt and mistake in its application. See generally B. JoNEs, EvIDENcE § 12.13, at
365-66 (6th ed. 1972). Moreover, in using this fact to support its reasoning, the Second Circuit
failed to recognize that witness testimony played a role in Economou's administrative hearing. See Arthur N. Economou, Commodity Exch. Auth. No. 167, at 2 (Chief Hearing Examiner, Aug. 17, 1971).
11 One commentator has defined an administrative agency as "a governmental authority
• . .which affects the rights of private parties through either adjucation or rule-making." 1
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.01 (1958).
- The power to formulate rules and regulations is so frequently used by administrative
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quasi-judicial functions in the resolution of disputes arising in situations under the administrative body's charge. 6 Viewed in this light,
the distinctions made by the Second Circuit between the duties of
administrative officials and the roles of legislators and judges, notably the court's belief that there exists wider discretion in the latter
officials,57 certainly becomes questionable. It is arguable that administrative officials generally possess a degree of discretion equivalent to that of judges and legislators and are similarly subject to the
hazard of private damage actions. Under this analysis, it is manifest that the reasons found by the Second Circuit to support absolute immunity for judges and legislators are applicable to administrators as well.
Although the ultimate result reached by the Second Circuit
may be a desirable one, it is submitted that the qualified immunity
approach developed in Economou could produce objectionable consequences. The effect of the Economou decision is to make the grant
of immunity to a federal official contingent on the official's good
faith and reasonableness in all cases, not simply those based on
violation of a constitutional right. This factor, coupled with the
apparent similarity between the standard of reasonableness used to
determine the availability of immunity and the standard used in
ordinary negligence actions, 9 appears to open the way for a possible
agencies that "[t]he volume of legislative output of federal agencies far exceeds the volume
of the legislative output of Congress." Id. § 1.02 at 8.
" Professor Davis notes that "[tihe quantity of adjudication in federal agencies is
probably many times the quantity of adjudication in federal courts." Id.
11535 F.2d at 696.
It is logical to assume that the free exercise of official discretion necessary for the
effective operation of the government can only be foreshortened by the potential liability of
administrative officials to damage actions. See Note, Immunity of ProsecutingOfficials From
Suit ForAlleged Deprivation of Civil Rights, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 244, 249 (1967).
"' In a negligence action, the standard of conduct is that of "the reasonable man of
ordinary prudence." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 150 (4th ed. 1971). According
to Prosser, "[tihe actor is required to do what such an ideal individual would be supposed
to do in his place." Id. Since the standard espoused by the Second Circuit in Economou
requires good faith, reasonable action, it is submitted that an executive official will be required to meet the standard of the reasonable executive official acting with good faith in his
position. As such, the similarity between the two standards becomes more noticeable and the
question arises whether the Second Circuit's standard will give rise to a negligence action.
One author has advocated the practicality of a reasonableness standard, maintaining
that such a standard would not materially increase the number of suits against administrative
officials. Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MiNN. L. REv. 263, 306 (1937).
Other commentators, however, commenting on the analogous area of judicial immunity have
stressed the unsatisfactory character of a negligence standard in actions against judges.
Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615, 623 (1970); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under
Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 334-35 (1969).
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action against a federal officer for negligence. An examination of the
section 1983 cases reinforces this possibility. 0 It should be noted,
however, that to allow a federal official to be sued for negligence
would be to expose him to wider liability than the analogous state
officer sued under section 1983 for a plaintiff suing under that
section must still prove that the controverted activity was performed under color of state law and that the action caused a denial
of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. 6 Moreover, the
threat of such suits might well have a devastating effect on the
operations of the federal government.6 2 Since the Second Circuit did
not expressly address the question, resolution of this problem must
be left to future decisions. An insight into the court's attitude on
this matter, however, may be gleaned from the panel's association
of the term "maliciously" with the phrase "without reasonable
grounds," and its later use of the word "knowingly" in its instructions to the trial court in reference to the showing necessary for
Economou to state a claim. 3 The use of these terms together
indicates that the court would require more than mere negligence
on the part of a federal official for an injured party to recover, with
a showing of gross or wanton negligence appearing to be the minimum requisite.
Despite the uneven course taken by the court, the result
reached in Economou appears to be the most equitable.64 A contin11A strict reading of the Supreme Court decisions would seem to require intent, or at
least bad faith, for a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975),
discussed in Note, Students' Rights Versus Administrators' Immunity: Goss v. Lopez and
Wood v. Strickland, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 102, 120-26 (1975). Despite this, the use of negligence as a basis for a cause of action against state officials under § 1983 has been the subject
of dispute among the courts. While some circuits have required malice, or bad faith, see, e.g.,
Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 980 (1st Cir.
1974); Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Jenkins v. Meyers, 338 F. Supp. 383
(N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd mem., 481 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973), others have allowed § 1983 actions
for gross negligence, see, e.g., Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). Still others
have utilized a standard of mere negligence. See, e.g., McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th
Cir. 1972); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969); Joseph
v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968). Through this melange of cases, the conclusion can
be drawn that the possibility of a negligence action against a federal officer does exist in the
wake of Economou. See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort
Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1972).
11 Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 789 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 (1969).
'2 See Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Pierson v.
Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 615 (1970); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under
Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969).
535 F.2d at 696.
A qualified immunity, similar to the type propounded in Economou, has been urged
as the best approach to the problem of official immunity. See, eg., Comment, The Defense
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uation of the Barr doctrine will result in the application of different
immunities dependent on whether the cause averred reaches constitutional heights.6 5 In contrast, the Economou decision engenders
uniformity in the approach to the immunity question, regardless
whether the action developed under the Constitution or the common
law. It increases the availability of the federal courts to an individual who has suffered injury at the hands of a government official,
while it provides suitable protection for those officials who have
acted faithfully and with good reason.6 The survival of the desirable
of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, 1971 WASH. U.L. REV. 666, which maintains that such
a standard would promote "the attainment of an equilibrium between" the interests of the
plaintiff and the protection of the official. Id. at 672.
0 The continuation of the Barr doctrine of absolute immunity from common law tort
actions would conflict with the Bivens qualified immunity from actions based on the Constitution. See note 37 supra. The awkwardness of a continued dichotomy in the extent of the
immunity granted a federal official dependent upon whether the complaint is concerned with
constitutional or nonconstitutional injuries is manifested by the fact that it would require a
court to make the initial determination whether the complaint is of constitutional import.
As one authority has noted, "the presence or absence of constitutional interests is not a
workable criterion." K. DAvIs, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 26.00-2, at 584 (1976).
This is so because
the courts should not have to say yes or no to such questions as whether one has a
constitutionalright not to be shot at by an officer, not to be hit in the jaw with an
officer's fist, not to have one's property damaged by an officer, not to have one's
privacy invaded, not to have one's reputation sullied.
Id. at 583-84 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, plaintiffs, seeking to overcome the lesser
obstacle of qualified immunity, would strain to base their common law actions on the Constitution. See id.
11Alternative approaches to the immunity question have not as yet adequately met the
focal requirements of this perplexing area. One of the other alternatives to absolute immunity
is a case-by-case evaluation as to whether the defendant should receive immunity in the
particular suit, based on such factors as the effect official liability would have on the orderly
administration of the law, the possibility of alternative remedies, the capability of the judiciary to evaluate the official's actions, and the degree and type of injury. See Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1963); Nahmod,
Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Immunity, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 26-30 (1972). This
alternative, however, would appear to be inadequate because of the burden it would place
on the parties, especially the defendant. Since it would require some type of hearing for every
action brought, it would result in the very diversion of time and energy from official duty that
is sought to be avoided by allowing immunity. The desire to free government officials from
the waste of time caused by needless trials has always been an important consideration in
immunity decisions. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974).
An alternate approach, which would avoid this case-by-case determination, is to grant
immunity in the absence of malice or bad faith on the official's part. See Kates, Immunity
of StateJudges Under the Federal Civil RightsAct: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L.
REV. 615, 623-24 (1970); Note, Liability of JudicialOfficers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322, 334-37 (1969). The reliance on the presence of bad faith alone has been criticized,
however, because it places an inordinate burden on the plaintiff. It requires the plaintiff to
shoulder the formidable task of proving malice or bad faith on the part of the official. See
Comment, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, 1971 WASH. U.L. REv. 666, 672.
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however, depends upon its ultimate
consequences of Economou,
7
Barr.1
with
reconciliation
Dennis P. Orr
In contrast, a standard based on pure reasonableness would subject an executive official to
the risk of personal liability for the mere negligent performance of his duties. See notes 59-62
and accompanying text supra.
It is hoped that the combination of good faith and reasonableness into one immunity
standard will solve these problems by ameliorating both the hardships placed on the plaintiff
by a mere good faith standard requiring a showing of pure malice, and the difficulties imposed
upon the defendant official by a pure reasonableness standard which may subject him to
liability for personal negligence. It represents a median between the two absolutes in which
something less than malicious injury, but more than mere negligence, will be the standard
for recovery.
The only alternative more favorable than the qualified immunity standard of good faith
and reasonableness is the congressional adoption of governmental liability for the acts of
government employees. See, e.g., Note, Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section 1983 Damage Actions with Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REv. 439
(1974). The plan has the endorsement of Chief Justice Burger, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421-23 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting), and is clearly the most
equitable for all concerned. Note, Sovereign Immunity - Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling
Section 1983 DamageActions with GovernmentalImmunities, 53 N.C.L. REv. 439, 448 & n.64
(1974).
" The logic of the Economou result does not ensure its longevity. The Barr challenge
must still be met since it appears that the Second Circuit incorrectly assumed that Barrhad
been overruled sub silentio. One obvious solution is the direct overruling of Barr by the
Supreme Court. Indeed, this was advocated by at least one authority even prior to Economou.
See K. DAvis, ADMmIsTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 26.00-2, at 584 (1976). Barr,a 5-to-4
decision, contained a number of separate opinions, no one of which commanded a majority
of the Court. Therefore, it is apparent that Barr is certainly not beyond aspersion. See 360
U.S. at 586 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
An alternative to the outright overruling of Barr would be limiting it to its particular
facts, i.e., to defamation actions. See Shipp v. Waller, 391 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.D.C. 1975).
Restricting the applicability of Barr to defamation actions can be justified by the fact that
defamation actions traditionally have involved principles of privilege and immunity. As
Prosser has stated: "In an action for defamation, the plaintiff's prima facie case is made out
when he has established a publication to a third person for which the defendant is responsible,
the recipient's understanding of the defamatory meaning, and its actionable character." W.
PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 114, at.776 (4th ed. 1971). In such an action, the defendant
may set up the defenses of privilege or truth, either of which, upon being established, will
completely immunize him from liability. Id. The defense of privilege, while encompassing the
absolute immunities of judges, lesiglators, and executive officials in their communications,
also contains privileges enjoyed by individuals in the private sector. See generally id. § 115.
Since a plaintiff would still have to surmount numerous possible defenses on the part of an
executive official, it would seem that the retention of an official's absolute immunity in this
sphere would be less inequitable than in other areas. It would also find support in the
concurring opinion of Justice Black in Barr, which expressed his fear of the inhibitory effect
of defamation suits on the free flow of information. See 360 U.S. at 576 (Black, J., concurring).

